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Abstract
Fifty years ago, a paper entitled ‘College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage’ 
was published in a somewhat obscure journal, the American Mathematical 
Monthly (currently a ‘B’ journal, according to the Australian Business Deans 
Council). The research program and policy developments that have flowed from 
that abstract and apparently slight seven-page paper recently led to the award of 
the 2012 Nobel Prize for Economics to one of its authors, Lloyd Shapley. (Shapley’s 
co-author, David Gale, died in 2008.) Shapley shared the Nobel Prize ‘for the 
theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design’ with US economist 
Alvin Roth, who has been responsible for much of the applied work that has built 
on Gale and Shapley’s insights. The history of the path leading from the abstract 
Gale/Shapley insights to the design of resource allocation mechanisms in 2012 is a 
fascinating and instructive one for many reasons. This article tries to give the reader 
an idea of what this literature is about, and of the many ways in which Matching 
Theory has led to real improvements in the design of operational resource-allocation 
mechanisms.
Historical background
Gale and Shapley were interested in situations in which a group of agents 
want to be matched with one another. The agents may be prospective marriage 
partners, firms and workers, schools and schoolchildren, universities and 
students, hospitals and junior doctors, and so on. Of course, institutions and 
individuals faced the need to be matched to one another long before the Gale/
Shapley contribution. Decentralised procedures for college admission evolved 
in which colleges would independently solicit applications from students, and 
make offers to those considered most acceptable. This arrangement has several 
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drawbacks, of which one in particular regularly arose. If one institution wants 
to ‘steal a march’ on its competitors and attract the best students, it may be 
tempted to do so by getting in with an earlier offer, and trying to obtain binding 
acceptances from students. Thus, over time, one might expect to see institutions 
gradually making earlier and earlier offers. This is indeed what happened — by 
1945, some hospitals in the US were making offers to medical students up to two 
years before they had graduated from medical school! Such unravelling of the 
market, as this process has come to be called, is a common form of market failure, 
and generates substantial inefficiency. Although each institution may correctly 
perceive it to be in its interest to move earlier than its competitors, the outcome 
is that each thereby forgoes any useful information about that student’s quality 
that may emerge during those subsequent two years — information which, had 
it been available, might have led to an outcome in which some students and/or 
institutions obtain more desired matches. Ignoring such information may well 
leave all agents — both students and hospitals — worse-off.
In response to such inefficiencies, in time, clearinghouses evolved. Under such 
an arrangement, each institution may give up the right to make independent 
offers, instead committing itself to working through a central agency — the 
clearinghouse — which operates under prescribed rules and procedures 
concerning the submission of preferences over institutions by prospective 
students and the identification of acceptable students by institutions. Eventually 
a matching of students and colleges is achieved. Central clearinghouses evolved 
in various settings in a somewhat ad hoc way — one of the authors of the present 
discussion once applied for an undergraduate place in the UK through precisely 
such a clearing house, then known as UCCA (Universities Central Council on 
Admissions). Some seemed to work quite well, others less well, and some were 
quite short-lived. But at that time there was no clear understanding of what, 
precisely, might constitute a satisfactory clearinghouse, why some seemed to 
work well while others did not, and how one might go about analysing, let alone 
designing, effective clearinghouses.
Gale and Shapley changed that. They established an approach that has provided 
the accepted framework for the analysis of clearinghouses that involve no 
explicit money transfers — in this sense they are quite distinct from the typical 
commodity market — but which seek simply to attain a satisfactory matching 
of institutions and individuals. First, they stated clearly what one might mean 
by a ‘satisfactory’ matching. To this end, they introduced the idea of a ‘stable 
matching’. Second, they showed that under certain conditions a satisfactory 
matching would certainly exist. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, their 
demonstration of the existence of such satisfactory mechanisms took the form 
of a simple algorithm that actually found such an outcome. Their proposed 
algorithm has many attractive properties.
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A statement of the college admission problem
Suppose there are m students applying for college admission and n colleges 
available, each one of them offering some positions/places for new students. 
(Typically, m and n are different positive integer numbers.) Each student has a 
complete ranking over the colleges, based on her individual views and goals. 
Similarly, each college has a complete ranking over the new students. This may 
be based on information provided by students about academic attainments, but 
may well be influenced by other considerations — different colleges usually 
come up with different rankings over the students. What matters is that this 
‘market’ has two sides made of indivisible units: students and positions. Each 
member, on each side of the market, has her individual complete ranking of 
agents on the other side. Ties are not allowed.
A matching is a list of which college each student will attend. This list may say 
that a particular student does not have a college; or it may say that a college does 
not have all (or any) of its positions filled. In other words, a matching is a list of 
matches between students and colleges. We permit each college’s list of students 
to exclude some students. That is, each college is allowed to deem some students 
unacceptable, meaning that the college prefers to stay with some unfilled posts 
rather than admitting what it believes to be unacceptable students. Similarly, 
each student may find some colleges unacceptable. We say that an ‘agent’ (a 
student or a college) blocks a proposed allocation if in the proposed matching 
the agent is to be matched to an unacceptable pair, according to her preferences.
In this situation, is there a natural matching/allocation? That is, what would be 
natural or efficient or fair outcomes? How should we match/assign students to 
academic places? Some outcomes could be very favourable to some or even to 
all students, while other outcomes would be better for colleges. How should we 
combine the preferences of all agents in both sides of the market? Depending on 
how a mechanism does this, there could be incentives for misrepresentations of 
preferences; that is, for strategic manipulations. How could we prevent agents 
from ‘gaming the system’?
An interesting consideration is that, on each side of the market, agents have 
idiosyncratic preferences. There may be some correlation between preferences 
or it may be the case that each agent ranks the other side of the market in a 
completely different way. There is not a unique ‘correct’ ranking.
Gale and Shapley argued that a desirable property for an allocation is that it 
would be not possible to find a student i and a college j such that i prefers j to 
her prescribed college and, at the same time, college j prefers i to at least one of 
its prescribed students. In other words, no pair of agents blocks the proposed/
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prescribed matching. They defined a matching to be ‘stable’ if it is not blocked 
by any pair of agents and, at the same time, the individual rationality condition 
of every agent is satisfied; that is, no single agent blocks the proposed allocation.
A special case: The Stable Marriage Problem 
The easiest of the original problems posed by Gale and Shapley is the ‘Stable 
Marriage Problem’. This is a particular case of the College Admissions Problem 
where each college can admit only a unique student. In other words, the matching 
allocation is one-to-one. Each agent on each side of the market matches with at 
most one agent on the opposite side of the market.
The original paper refers to one side of the market as ‘females’ while the other 
side would be composed of ‘males’. As before, each female ranks all males up to 
a point, considering the remaining males as unacceptable (she would rather be 
alone rather than matched to any unacceptable male), and, likewise, each male 
identifies and ranks the females that he considers acceptable.
Gale and Shapley’s contribution
We have already drawn attention to the first of Gale and Shapley’s contributions 
— their statement of stability as a desirable characteristic of a matching outcome. 
In addition they suggested an algorithm that allows us to find stable outcomes in 
the Stable Marriage Problem. This is the famous Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. 
A variation of this algorithm generates a stable matching in the more complex 
Stable College Admissions Problem.
They proposed the use of a centralised mechanism for discrete resource 
allocations. This might explain the lack of interest by US economists in the 
1960s and 70s. The efficiency of free markets was a cornerstone of economics 
and the Arrow-Debreu Theorem had just made great academic impact.
The set of all stable allocations — that is, allocations such that no subset of 
agents can collude to make all agents in this subset better off — corresponds 
with the notion of the core, a concept that was systematically developed during 
the 1950s and 60s within the research program on General Equilibrium. In any 
coalitional game, an allocation is in the core if there is no blocking coalition of 
any size. In the matching context, for a matching to be stable, there can be no 
unilateral deviation or any blocking coalition of two players. If an allocation 
is in the core, then, trivially, it is stable. For the Stable Marriage Problem, the 
reciprocal statement is also true. Why is this true? Well, if there is an improving 
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coalition with more than two agents, there must be a subset of agents in this 
coalition with one or two players that would prefer to deviate from the original 
allocation. If an allocation is stable, there is no such subset. Hence, this allocation 
must be in the core.
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is remarkable in many ways. First, it 
proves the existence of at least one stable matching.
Second, the algorithm is reasonably simple and intuitive. While current 
economists may find it a very desirable and convenient feature, this is somewhat 
surprising for a paper written by two mathematicians 50 years ago. Most papers in 
mathematics at that time, and even nowadays, propose very complex structures 
and algorithms. By contrast, Gale and Shapley’s rigorous demonstration of the 
existence of a stable outcome — to which we will return later — contains, as 
they point out (p.15), ‘…no obscure or technical terms. Knowledge of calculus 
is not presupposed. In fact, one hardly needs to know how to count.’
Third, the DAA runs in finite time and is relatively easy to a program in a 
computer. Gale and Shapley proved that their procedure has at most n2 – 2n + 2 
stages, where n is the number of agents on each side of the market.
Fourth, usually there are multiple stable allocations for any given instance of the 
Stable Marriage Problem. Depending on how we set the algorithm to run, it can 
generate the allocation that is best, among all stable ones, for males or the best 
allocation for all females. In other words, if we are restricted to the collection 
of stable matching allocations only, then all males would never disagree in their 
ranking of any two proposals. The same is true for females. Moreover, in the set 
of all stable matching allocations, the ‘male best’ stable matching is exactly the 
‘female worst’ matching and vice-versa. According to mathematicians, the set 
of all stable allocations form what they call a ‘distributive lattice’, a very useful 
but somewhat unknown mathematical concept. Analogous considerations hold 
for the Stable College Admissions Problem. Topkis (1978) has more on lattices 
and optimisation on such domains.
Fifth, even though the algorithm itself may involve arbitrary choices, the set 
of all stable matching allocations does not depend on chance. Although chance 
does play a role sometimes, nobody can complain too much of ‘bad luck’. If an 
agent is not matched by the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm to some other agent 
ranking relatively high in her preference list, it is likely that she is simply not 
ranked highly by any one of her most favoured matches. This property may be 
an important feature in persuading the public to accept the implementation of 
a central mechanism.
Agenda, Volume 20, Number 2, 2013
66
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Consider an instance of the Stable Marriage Problem. We will describe a version 
of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) in which men propose to women. 
The algorithm has a sequence of such proposals. All agents start ‘free’. Men 
can alternate between being free or ‘engaged’ several times during the process, 
but women cannot become free after they are engaged. Women who are free 
always accept an engagement proposal of any acceptable man, but will turn this 
man down if she ever receives a proposal from a more desirable agent. Engaged 
women reject proposals from men that are less desirable than her current engaged 
partner. Men who are free keep making proposals, but engaged men do not.
The version of the DAA in which men are the proposers works as follows:
• All agents start free.
• The following procedure is repeated as long as any man is free; when no free 
men remain, the algorithm terminates.
• The men in a randomly chosen order make proposals.
• The current man makes a proposal to the most desirable woman in his list 
who has not already rejected him.
• If this woman is free, then she and her proposer become engaged. 
• Otherwise, if she prefers the proposer to her current partner, she becomes 
disengaged from her existing partner — who thereby becomes free — and 
becomes engaged to the current proposer; otherwise, she rejects the proposer.
• This procedure is repeated for the next man.
• As already stated, the algorithm ends when no free men remain.
When the algorithm ends, the couples who are engaged at that stage become 
matched.
It turns out that the order in which men make their proposals does not affect the 
outcome of the algorithm. In the process, each man starts with highly desirable 
partners, but as the algorithm proceeds, he can only go down in his preference 
list. However, each woman can only move up in her preference list, as she 
receives proposals from a range of different men, but switches partners only if 
it is in her advantage to do so (she rejects all proposals from men who are less 
desirable than her current engagement). Because both the set of men and the set 
of women are finite, the algorithm always ends in a finite number of steps.
We urge curious readers to indulge themselves by reading the original proof 
of the existence of a stable matching in Gale and Shapley (1962: 11–12). The 
following argument captures its main insight. Suppose that man X1 is matched 
to woman Y1, but prefers woman Y2 to Y1. During the DAA, man X1 proposes 
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to woman Y2 before he proposes to woman Y1. The reason he is not matched to 
Y2 is either because woman Y2 has rejected X1’s proposal (since she had a better 
partner) or because woman Y2 accepted the proposal by man X1, but afterwards 
obtained a proposal from a more desirable man. In either case, Y2 ended up with 
a man that she considers better than man X1.
Consider the following example of the men-proposing version of DAA: there are 
three men (X1, X2, X3), and three women (Y1, Y2, Y3). Preferences are as follows: 
the last option of each agent is to end up alone. Among members of the opposite 
sex, preferences are:
X1: Y1, Y2, Y3 (meaning that man X1 prefers woman Y1 to Y2, and prefers Y2 to Y3);
X2: Y2, Y3, Y1;
X3: Y1, Y2, Y3;
Y1: X2, X3, X1;
Y2 X1, X2, X3;
Y3: X3, X1, X2.
Suppose men make proposals in the order: X1 first, then X2, and finally X3. In this 
case, man X1 proposes to woman Y1, who accepts. Man X2 proposes to woman 
Y2, who accepts. Man X3 proposes to woman Y1, who accepts (because woman 
Y1 prefers X3 to X1), making man X1 free again. Man X1 proposes to woman Y2 
who accepts (because woman Y2 prefers X1 to X2), making man X2 to become free 
again. Man X2 proposes to woman Y3 who accepts. The resulting matching is: 
(X1, Y2), (X2, Y3), and (X3, Y1). The theory tells us that this matching is a stable 
matching in this particular example.
But there are multiple stable matching outcomes. The two versions — 
distinguished by whether men or women are the proposers — lead to different 
stable outcomes. For instance, if women make proposals in the order Y1 first, 
then Y2, and finally Y3, the DAA proceeds as follows: woman Y1 proposes to 
man X2, who accepts. Woman Y2 proposes to man X1, who accepts. Woman Y3 
proposes to man X3, who accepts. The resulting matching is: (X1, Y2), (X2, Y1), and 
(X3, Y3). This is also a stable matching.
Man X1 and woman Y2 are matched in both the man-proposing and woman-
proposing versions. However, the man-proposing version of the DAA is strictly 
preferable to the woman-proposing version for men X2 and X3. Indeed, man X2 
prefers to be matched with woman Y3 (his second-best option) than with Y1, 
which is his third-best option. Man X3 prefers Y1 (his first option) to woman Y3, 
which is only his third-best option. On the other hand, women Y1 and Y3 strictly 
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prefer their partners under the woman-proposing version to those under the 
man-proposing version of the DAA. For instance, woman Y1 prefers man X2 
rather than man X3.
Later developments by Roth and others
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) is a North American NGO 
that matches medical school students with residency positions that are available 
in any given year. The NRMP started to operate in 1952 and is sponsored by 
several medical associations. Before that, there was keen competition among 
hospitals for the best talent. Hospitals would make job offers independently of 
one another. Around 1944 individuals received offers up to two full years before 
their graduation. Agreement on the need for some kind of clearinghouse, or 
centralized market, was reached around 1950.2
Matches occurring two years before students complete their training tend to 
suggest that students lack incentive to study really hard during their last two 
years. As a consequence, they probably become less competent doctors. This is 
a clear source of inefficiency. Because many of the best positions are taken two 
years before they graduate, unmatched medical students also find fewer reasons 
to study hard in their last two years. Hence, matching a group of medical 
students two years before graduation may severely diminish the incentives of 
all students — both earlier matched and unmatched — to study hard.
Of course, two full years before graduation the information available regarding 
future doctors’ skills is less precise than what we would obtain if matches were 
made at graduation time. This was another significant source of inefficiency.
Up until 1995, the version of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm used by 
the NRMP always generated the matching assignment that was the best for 
hospitals, among the subset of all stable allocations, and worst for doctors. Since 
1998 the revised NRMP algorithm finds the doctor-optimal stable matching. 
Interestingly, only a small proportion of the assigned doctor-hospital pairs 
would change, whether we run the previous or the current algorithm. This is 
a positive feature of the procedure. Later, the NRMP started to allow for the 
possibility that couples would submit joint preference lists. This makes the 
assignment problem significantly harder.
The unravelling of the market has been particularly acute in the process by 
which US federal court judges hire federal judicial law clerks. Avery et al. (2001) 
2 Roth and Peranson (1999: footnote 5) claim that the ‘…initial NRMP algorithm, dating from 1951, [was] 
the first we know of’. For more details on the history of the DAA and NRMP, see Roth (1984), Gusfield and 
Irving (1989) or Roth and Sotomayor (1992).
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note that, at the time when many prominent law schools in 1999 abandoned their 
attempts to regulate the time at which letters of recommendation could be sent, 
the clerk-hiring process got under way two years before the clerkship positions 
themselves were due to begin. The behaviour of judges in their attempts to jump 
the gun on their rivals in making early offers and seeking binding acceptances 
in order to attract the best candidates, led the New York Times to refer to the 
process as a judicial ‘free-for-all’ in which judges ‘behave[ed] like 6-year-olds’. 
One judge likened the process to a ‘calf scramble … the low point of many 
western rodeos’ — not an image that most of us have of the judiciary!
Some significant characteristics of this piece 
of intellectual history
In the original formulation, the Stable Marriage Problem assumes that both sides 
of the market have n agents. It turns out that this assumption is not terribly 
important. The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm runs unchanged when the 
numbers of agents on each side of the market are distinct/different from each 
other.
In reality, a large part of the work done by Alvin Roth and his co-authors deals 
with institutional particularities. Yet the central ideas of Matching Theory are 
always present and the researchers continue to create and develop new abstract 
ideas, concepts, algorithms and mathematical techniques that will, in the 
future, become the basic knowledge upon which concrete, applicable real-world 
solutions will be developed.
The lesson is two-fold: first we learn from this history that one must be willing to 
adapt abstract frameworks to tackle real-life problems — what Roth refers to as 
‘social engineering’. Second, the search for pure, abstract algorithms and formal 
mathematical results in idealised environments is crucially important. Abstract 
models have provided critically important changes in paradigm. They can shed 
light on difficult problems and indicate directions where possible solutions lie 
and where there is need for more knowledge and more pure or applied research. 
Too frequently governments have a myopic focus. However, the power of very 
abstract ideas is enormous.
Investment in abstract modelling may save public funding because the same 
central principles can typically be used in a wide variety of applications. In 
short, a single investment may generate many fruits, if we are prepared to adapt 
it to the idiosyncratic features of each institutional framework.
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The award of this particular Nobel Prize provides a good opportunity for 
reflection. Where are our tax dollars best spent — in very concrete yet 
somewhat limited research of clear immediate practical use, or in more abstract 
research with no immediately apparent connection to reality, but deep scientific 
significance? For instance, would it be better to invest one dollar with the 
certainty of collecting two, or to invest one dollar with a one per cent probability 
of collecting a thousand?
We would argue that research in economic theory has, on average, more of a 
‘public-good nature’ than a good deal of applied research. Very applied research 
is designed — by its very nature — to deal with a very particular case. Lessons 
may sometimes be transported to some other situations, but typically on a rather 
small scale. By contrast, the ideas in Gale and Shapley’s analysis of matching are 
non-rival — their use in one setting does not limit their use in others. Cornes 
and Sandler (1996) provide an extended discussion of this non-rivalry property 
in the context of public-good theory, and Romer (1990) discusses its crucial 
importance in the context of technological change and welfare. A matching 
algorithm can be used time and time again — to match medical interns with 
hospitals, students with schools, law clerks with law courts or legal firms. 
Further, once it is developed, its extension and adaptation for other uses is 
a relatively low-cost matter, as is evidenced in the developments from Gale 
and Shapley’s original insights up to the more complicated algorithms being 
developed today by Roth and many others.
The example of combinatorial analysis and 
auctions
A new important research trend inside auction theory is the study of 
combinatorial auctions; that is, procedures to auction bundles of heterogeneous 
goods, instead of a single product. The idea is that these different products may 
complement or substitute each other and these degrees of complementarities or 
substitutability may be idiosyncratic. For instance, suppose you want to sell a 
table and a set of chairs that fit the table. Is it better to hold two auctions, one 
for the table and another for the chairs, or to sell the entire bundle in a single 
auction?
Matching Theory and Auction Theory are the two faces of what current 
researchers call “Market Design”. Rassenti et al. (1982) use experimental 
analysis to study the design for airport time-slot auctions. They propose the 
use of a combinatorial auction mechanism. De Vries and Vohra (2003) provide 
a classic survey of combinatorial auctions. Their survey reveals that over the 
last 10 years there have been substantial theoretical advances on this front and 
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that many new applications have emerged in a wide variety of contexts — sales 
of many products and services such as furniture, airport time slots for airlines, 
delivery routes, and network routing are among the huge variety of situations 
in which combinatorial analysis is proving useful. More recently, Vohra (2011) 
has shown how combinatorial reasoning, in the form of linear programming, can 
be used to develop and understand modern mechanism design.
Other significant areas within economics that use the ideas of combinatorial 
analysis are Voting Theory and Matching Theory, as well as all problems related 
to the allocation of indivisible goods. However, for some traditional economists 
educated to work only with calculus, optimisation and differential methods 
with continuous variables, the language of combinatorial analysis represents 
a huge challenge. It is so because, unfortunately, discrete mathematics, even 
its elementary ideas and concepts, is no longer part of the typical university 
training in the field of economics.
The basic ideas of permutations and combinations are extremely helpful in the 
education of university students. Few concepts are as efficient to help students 
learn how to think analytically, in an organised way, as the basic counting and 
ordering principles of combinatorial analysis. Their presence in the syllabus 
helps to make students learn how to think and how to organise complex 
structures and ideas in their minds. Ironically, these virtues may partly explain 
their gradual disappearance from university economics syllabuses since the 
1960s — under ever-increasing time and resource pressures, it may have been 
easier and quicker to teach alternative approaches that rely more heavily on a 
relatively uncritical application of ‘cookbook recipes’.
Current applications of Matching Theory
In the last two decades ever more applications for Gale and Shapley’s Matching 
Theory have been found. Although they rarely make front-page news in the 
manner of the latest macroeconomic or financial ‘crisis’, these applications are 
beginning to have a significant beneficial impact on the lives of millions of 
people — as resident doctors and patients with transplanted kidneys in the 
USA or parents of children benefiting from a better high school allocation in 
New York or Boston public schools system would tell you — and to change the 
world we live in.
Matching Theory is used today to allocate secondary students to public high 
schools in New York and Boston, two very large educational systems. Before 
entering as incoming freshmen, all students submit a preferred high school list, 
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and high schools set criteria that effectively rank all new students in the city 
system. This work was done by Alvin Roth together with Atila Abdulkadiroglu, 
Parag A. Pathak and Tayfun Sonmez (Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2005).
Roth (2002) brings quantitative evidence about observed benefits of stability in 
matching mechanisms used in practice, focusing on different regional markets 
for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. Roth’s paper describes 
quantitative evidence found in previous papers and displays (Table 1: 1354) 
the average costs of markets. Among markets with a clearinghouse, one group 
indicates similar costs between the DAA and the Newcastle Priority Algorithm 
— an alternative algorithm that does not take the Gale and Shapley concept of 
stability into account. However, in two other cases, the costs associated with the 
DAA are significantly lower than the cost associated to the Newcastle Priority 
Algorithm.
An unexpected benefit of using Matching Theory in practice was to decrease 
corruption in some cases. As the centralised mechanism was implemented in 
school districts, local authorities lost their power to accept or reject students to 
high schools. To the surprise of some, extra positions became available in many 
schools.
Matching Theory has had a dramatic effect on the allocation of high school 
students. Every year, in New York City School District alone, there are around 
100 000 new high school students entering the system. All of their families 
provide a list of preferences and the schools provide their criteria to rank the 
entrant students. Obtaining a better allocation of school leaves thousands of 
families better off and their kids will probably learn more and become more 
productive workers. As economists know well, enhancing human capital leads 
to a permanent increment in productivity.
Organ transplantation is another major beneficiary of Matching Theory. 
Typically, the waiting list for deceased donors is very long. Many patients die 
before a compatible organ is available. A partial solution to this problem is to 
increase the incentives for live donors. Often a patient can find a living donor, 
usually a spouse or sibling. However, rarely is the donor organ compatible with 
the patient’s biology. In this context, Matching Theory and Market Design have 
played a crucial role in the design of the institutional rules that generate the 
best incentives and the largest possible number of successful organ donations. 
Indeed, it seems to have been precisely this application that drew the Nobel 
committee’s attention to the work of Alvin Roth.
A feature of the market for organ donation is that it is illegal to buy or sell 
human organs in most countries, including all developed countries. Even if 
both parties agree on the terms, the law does not allow for such transactions. 
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(For example, in the US, the National Organ Transplant Act forbids contracts 
for organ transplantations.) Moreover, organs are indivisible. This is exactly the 
framework of Matching Theory, and indeed much has been done recently.
Alvin Roth, together with Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Utku Unver and 
Tayfun Sonmez, and with the support from the US National Science Foundation, 
developed the ideas, procedures and software needed to match living kidney 
donors with recipients. Their research and ideas from idealised abstract models 
are achieving what had earlier seemed impossible: that a single extra donation 
can help to spark a long chain of donations, saving many lives directly and 
decreasing the waiting times of patients in the waiting lists, which in turn, 
greatly increases the probability of success in organ transplantations. Also, 
reduced waiting lists improve dramatically the welfare of thousands of patients. 
It is no longer the case that one donor helps a single sick person.
The literature on two-sided matching uses elements of economic theory as well 
as empirical and experimental analysis, as explained by Roth (2002).
Conclusions
The history of Matching Theory teaches us several valuable lessons.
First, it could be dangerous to dismiss basic research as necessarily less important 
because of its lack of obvious immediate impact on pressing problems of the day. 
This is a crucial observation these days as policy circles discuss the introduction 
of policies that try to measure research impact.
Second, some of the most applicable and useful ideas often come along first in the 
most abstract forms. They require time to mature and to prove their true value; 
in this case a few decades. This does not fit with the politics of the democratic 
electoral cycle. Hence, support for deep research must be a national priority 
above and beyond the politics of the day. Funding for basic research should be 
allocated in a way that it becomes untouchable to political actors, both within 
and outside universities. Matching Theory is a great example — perhaps the 
best — of a line of research in economics which, initially, may have seemed like 
a piece of  academic self-indulgence, yet ultimately having — as its authors 
surmised — real significance to real allocation issues. It is not unfair to ask 
how the Gale/Shapley piece would have been shoehorned into the straitjacket 
of national priorities.
Third, the power of abstract mathematical ideas should never be underestimated. 
Looking to social sciences or policy studies through the lens of what seems to 
be of immediate national significance will probably lead to myopic incentive 
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schemes that are detrimental to mathematics and to the creation of powerful 
abstract new ideas and concepts. At the end of the day, such short-sightedness 
may generate an academic sector producing less significant outcomes, most of 
which use, at best, simplistic and conventional ideas. This would be a poor path 
for our society to follow.
Fourth, Matching Theory is a great example of the breadth of current 
economic theory. It explores the ideas behind allocation of resources, and their 
implications for human wellbeing. Of course, topics related to the allocation of 
goods and agents are always interesting to economists, whatever the particular 
circumstances.
As John Maynard Keynes famously wrote in Essays in Persuasion: ‘If economists 
could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people on a 
level with dentists that would be splendid.’
In this piece, we have drawn attention to economists who, through their 
association not with dentists but with school administrators, renal transplant 
surgeons and others, have greatly enhanced the wellbeing of many individuals. 
We suspect that many contemporary critics of economics, and indeed some of 
our colleagues within the discipline, are simply unaware of its involvement in 
the design of resource allocation mechanisms of the kind that we have described, 
and of their potential benefits.
Finally, Matching Theory is an area with proven positive results in terms of 
public policy. However, in Australia, high school graduates are not allocated 
to universities with the use of a centralised mechanism that uses the DAA. 
The implementation of such a scheme would improve access of students to 
universities and would also lead to better matches between the two sides of 
the market. There are plenty of other areas that could benefit if Australian 
policymakers decided to use Matching Theory to formulate and implement 
better public policies.
We leave the last word to the writer of the piece in The Economist3 which 
announced the award of the 2012 Nobel Prize: ‘The recognition of Mr Shapley’s 
and Mr Roth’s work is also a reminder: that for all the bad press economics has 
received since the [financial] crisis, the discipline still brims over with insights 
that can solve real-life problems.’
3 20 October 2012.
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